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The Science of International Law. By T. A. Walker, 1893.
Cha jters on the Principles of International Law. By John Westlake,
1894.
In the English Universities, usage requires the yearly pro-
duction of an uncertain number of lectures, by the holders of
lectureships and professorships. It was in compliance with this
usage, that both the books under review have appeared. Both
are written by Cambridge lecturers; both, too, devote more or
less of their earlier pages to combating the definitions of Austin.
The application of his definition of law to their science has always
had results rather galling to the international jurist. According
to Austin "law" is the sum of those rules of conduct which are
imposed upon men by a political superior who is not himself sub-
ject to any superior. To this definition the rules governing the
intercourse of states do not correspond, because they have been
set by no superior, but have grown up on the basis of reason,
justice, and particularly usage. They cannot be called law in any
proper sense, therefore, but are rather to be defined as "positive
international morality." Against this dictum there is now a gen-
eral revolt, to which both Mr. Walker and Mr. Westlake give
expression. Westlake argues that Austin failed to emphasize the
distinction between rules which the " conscience of man allows
and often even requires him to enforce, and the claims commonly
called moral ones, which he asserts no such right of making good."
He objects also that the term international morality is obscure,
that it does not exhaust or measure the ethical duties of states,
and that therefore an ethical margin exists beyond the realm of
positive duty, which latter but for too fine distinctions should be
dignified with the term law. He quotes Prof. Bernard, who
wrote that "the fallacy suggested by the phrase 'international
morality,' is a more practically mischievous one than the fallacy
suggested by the phrase 'international law,' because the tempta-
tion to overstrain legal analogies and clothe mere opinions
indiscriminately in the robe of law, is less dangerous than the
contrary tendency to degrade fixed rules into mere opinions."
Westlake adds that "both fallacies may be avoided if we decline
to treat the law of the land as the only proper kind of jural law,
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for then, while keeping law distinct from morality, we shall not
encourage an undue attribution to international law of the char-
acters only appropriate to the law of the land." And again with
much force he says, between international and national law
"enough resemblance exists to justify comprising them in one
genus by the common name of law. But to preclude the inquiry
into resemblance by laying down, a priori, that law must be the
command of a political superior, is to import into a natural science
the mode of defining proper to an abstract one." Mr. Walker
attacks Austin's definition at much greater length, with some heat
and rhetoric, but perhaps not quite so conclusively. The objec-
tions to it in his mind are three: historical, philological, and that
based on common usage. Historical, for he argues that early law
was custom enforced by local opinion. Since international law is
built up upon usage, the argument that usage was law in early
communities suited the author's book very nicely. His philologi-
cal objection is based on the fact that in the words meaning law
in the early languages, there is no etymological trace of the idea
of command by a political superior. And thirdly, he insists that
Austin's definition is contrary to common usage, that under the
guise of utility it simply confuses the situation, and that the Aus-
tinian criticisms on international law though "very interesting
and quite innocuous," as Sir Henry Maine said, if they passed
outside of the schools might put the peace of the world in jeopardy.
Mr. Walker's book covers pretty well the entire field of the rela-
tions of states to another, calling those in time of peace normal;
in time of war abnormal. His illustrations are plentiful, his
language at times rather "highfalutin," t1is national bias strong
though not unduly so. His logic is not infallible. Thus he
opposes the exemption of innocent enemy's property at sea from
capture, as the Marcy amendment proposed, by the argument
that it ought not to suffer less than similar property on land which
is subject to requisitions, forgetting that the only excuse for
requisitions is the necessity of the occupant army in the way of
maintenance or transportation. Goods, occasionally contraband,
preempted, would be a better analogy. The book is readable
but by no means necessary to the practicing lawyer, or even to an
advanced student in the subject of which it treats. Westlake, in
much smaller compass, has given an original and interesting dis-
cussion of several timely topics, notably the modern theory of
acquisition of territory as applied to Central Africa, and the inter-
national origin of the British Empire in India. The final chapter
on the Rules of War as laws, is sensible and masterly. Alto-
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
gether, it is an admirable study of certain interesting topics
connected with his science, and well worth perusal. There is
absolutely no index.
Handbook of American Consitutional Law. By Henry Campbell
Black, M.A. Price $3-75 net. West Publishing Co., St. Paul.
1895.
Mr. Black, the author of the treatise on judgments, has now
contributed to the Horn-book series, a volume of 6oo pages on
our Constitutional law, National and State. So large a subject
can hardly be treated, except in outline, within the limits of what
is intended as an elementary work for class-room use in legal
education. This has led, and perhaps required, the author often
to state propositions broadly, and without qualification, which,
while generally, are far from universally ieceived. Thus he
asserts (p. 77) that the three departments of government are sep-
arated by a principle which requires that neither should encroach
upon the jurisdiction of the other or be charged with duties foreign
to the field of its legitimate activity. As an illustration, he adds
that the legislature cannot grant a pardon or remit a fine. This,
of course, can only be true, when the pardoning power is exclu-
sively committed by the Constitution to another department of
the government. It can, however, he observes (p. 79), grant a
divorce, if it proceeds no further than the dissolution of the
marriage without affecting property rights of the parties, citing
as the first authority, Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541, a case which
holds that not only can a legislative divorce dissolve a marriage,
but that it can divest creditors of the husband of an estate during
coverture in the lands of the wife, which the marriage gave him,
and on which they had previously levied an execution. Mr. Black
lays down the rule (p. 61) that a statute cannot be declared invalid
because it is opposed to the principles of natural justice or the
supposed spirit of the Constitution. There are undoubtedly
strong reasons in favor of the adoption of such a rule, and many
able writers and thinkers have been persuaded that it now exists.
But since, in the great case of Loan Association v. To eka, the
Supreme Court of the United States deliberately took the opposite
view, and acted upon it to the extent of adjudging a State statute
void, where no Federal question was involved, it is somewhat
venturesome to state such a rule as established in American
Courts. Mr. Justice Clifford alone dissented from that decision,
and it has since been unanimously re-affirmed (Parkersburg v.
Brown, io6 U. S 487). The various topics of discussion are
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somewhat unequally treated in respect to the space accorded to
each. The more important ones do not always receive the fullest
consideration. The treatment of the subject of suits against State
officers, on account of acts done or threatened under State laws is
quite meagre, and makes no allusion to the distinction drawn in
the later cases, between legal and equitable remedies. In dis-
cussing the legislation of Congress respecting weights and meas-
ures, we notice no reference to the Act 'of 1894, in relation to the
units of electrical measure. The general arrangement of the
topics treated is convenient, and the leading authorities are cited
with sufficient fullness to make the work valuable as a book of
reference, to the practitioner.
The Yale Banner, Volume LIII. H. T. Halbert, J. W. Roe
and C. W. Halbert, Editors and Publishers. Price $2.00. New
Haven. 1894.
This is certainlr the best and most attractive edition of the
Banner that has yet appeared. The front page contains the
photographs of eight prominent members of the various depart-
ments of the University, grouped about President Dwight.
Among these is the familiar face of Professor E. J. Phelps. The
Society Houses, the Editorial Boards of the various college pub-
lications, the Musical Organizations, and the Athletic Teams, are
all represented by full page photogravures. The Eating Clubs,
with their amusing cuts, add much brightness and fun to the
pages. The University Directory together with the complete
records of the athletic teams, make the book especially valuable
as a book of reference. The photogravures, the steel engravings,
the club cuts, the press work and the quality of paper, are excellent.
Architect, Owner and Builder, Before the Law. By T. M. Clark,
Fellow of the American Institute of Architects. One volume, 387
pages, cloth. Price, $3.00. Macmillan & Co., New York and
London, 1894.
The object of this book, as the author himself suggests, is
twofold, viz.: to assist on the one hand, lawyers in overcoming
the difficulties present in building cases, because of the technical
knowledge necessary to successfully try the same, and on the
other hand to aid architects and builders in obtaining a knowledge
of the legal principles applicable to their business, and thus pre-
vent controversies of this class from arising. The author himself,
a mixture of lawyer and architect, is especially fitted, as his
work shows, to write on a subject of this nature. The volume
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itself is divided into two parts, viz.: Part I., dealing with the
relation of "The Architect to the Owner," and Part IL, the rela-
tion of "The Architect to the Builder." A distinguishing and
useful feature of the work, is the great number of cases cited;
the index of cases by States especially so. The chapter on "The
Rights of the Lowest Bidder," is an excellent concise statement
of the law on that subject, and the book on the whole is one mer-
iting the attention of all persons interested in that subject, whether
as lawyers or laymen.
Rules of Evidence as Presented by the Common Law for the trial of
Actions and Proceedings. By George W. Bradner. Sheep; 68o
pages, $5.00 net. Callaghan & Co., Chicago, i895.
Mr. Bradner is a painstaking and conscientious compiler. His
cases exhaust their topic, and, while tersely illustrating a point,
the multitude of points thus illustrated makes the book a compre-
hensive one. We cannot quite agree that Mr. Bradner has fol-
lowed Stephens' arrangement. In many instances he has allowed
himself to depart from Sir James logical arrangement And yet
to the practitioner it is of little consequence whether the point he
is looking for be on page 1oo or 5oo, so long as the point is there.
We should say that comprehensiveness, not logical arrangement,
is the chief merit of this book. Herein Mr. Bradner's work is
more like Greenleaf than it is like Stephens. A well equipped
lawyer should own Bradner on Evidence. It does not supplant any
of the old masters; this its author admits, but it modernizes all of
them, and to win cases one must have modern law. For the pub-
lishers we have only commendation. The binding and printing
are in Messrs. Callaghan's usual neat and serviceable style.
